Vol 11 2007 the edinburgh law review Scottish Ministers. First, Ministers must confi rm that a community body is suitably constituted as a company limited by guarantee with a main purpose which is "consistent with furthering the achievement of sustainable development". 5 Ministers must also decide whether or not a community interest is to be registered in the Register of Community Interests in Land, and must advise the Keeper accordingly. Finally, Ministers must consent to the exercise of the right to buy itself, after community members have approved the buyout in a ballot. 6 Of these three stages, it is arguably the second (registration) where Ministerial consent is of most signifi cance. The fi rst stage is largely declaratory, 7 while the criteria at the fi nal stage (exercise) are largely repetitive of previous provisions of the Act, 8 so that it is diffi cult to visualise a scenario in which a community body -on the back of a ballot in favour of exercising the right to buy -would not be granted consent, unless there had been a major change in its management or structure. 9 The registration stage is also crucial because of its implications for the landowner. After registration the landowner is forbidden from transferring the land other than in a manner compliant with the terms of the Act, 10 thus making the community body the preferred, and effectively the only possible, bidder. In a concession to predictability in the marketplace, the legislation differentiates between punctual and "late" applications for registration, thus minimising disruption to a landowner seeking to transfer land not currently subject to a community interest. Where an application is timeous, i.e. before the land is exposed for sale, it falls under section 38 and the community must demonstrate only that there is support in the community for registration and that registration is in the public interest. Late applications, however, fall under section 39 and must demonstrate that the level of support is "signifi cantly greater" than under section 38 and that the factors surrounding the application are "strongly indicative" of it being in the public interest, while further satisfying Ministers that there were good reasons for the application being late. 5 Section 34(4). 6 Section 51(3). 7 With the exception of the sustainable development test. If Ministers do not confi rm that a body's purposes are consistent with sustainable development, it is unclear what remedy is available to them: see Combe (n 4) at 220. 8 In s 51(3), the tests relating to whether the land is registrable and whether the purchase is in the public interest are repeated from ss 38 and 39, while s 51(3)(b) goes as far as to refer explicitly to compliance with the community body tests in s 34. Section 51(3)(c) makes one of several references to sustainable development, this time with specifi c reference to what the community plans to do with the land, with the result that this test may be the one to which community bodies should pay most attention at the activation stage. 9 Section 51(3)(e). 10 Section 40(1). 11 Section 39.
B. THE HOLMEHILL LITIGATION
The facts of Holmehill can be simply stated. A resident of the area in question, realising that land owned by Stakis Limited was for sale, felt that it would be benefi cial to the community for this to come into community ownership. A petition was gathered to evidence community support, eventually attracting 887 signatures from a possible 6670 on the electoral roll.
12 Holmehill Limited was incorporated as a community body, with Ministers confi rming on 15 February 2005 that the newly formed company complied with the sustainable development criterion set out in section 34. An application for registration of a community interest in land was submitted shortly thereafter, under section 39, but was ultimately rejected. 13 The Scottish Ministers felt good reasons had not been demonstrated for the application being late.
14 They also felt that the factors surrounding the application were not strongly indicative of it being in the public interest but were only "fi nely balanced". 15 The "signifi cantly greater support" requirement 16 was not referred to. Section 61 of the Act provides for an appeal to the sheriff court against a Ministerial decision, and Holmehill Limited made use of this statutory appeal.
17 From the outset, there was no question of the application being anything other than late, and that issue was not under appeal. It is clear the buyout concept was not even conceived until advertising hoardings were noticed, so the easier route under section 38 was never available. If it had been, the application would have led to registration.
18
One interesting detail to note is that another community organisation, the Dunblane Development Trust, attempted to submit an application 26 days before Holmehill, but this was rejected as the Trust did not meet the criteria asked of a community body.
19
The requirement to incorporate as a company limited by guarantee has been criticised elsewhere, 20 but this case highlights another possible criticism of the incorporation requirement. If land was not exposed for sale at the beginning of the incorporation process, but appeared on the market during the window occasioned by the need to form a suitable company, a community would be forced to traverse the more diffi cult section 39 route. Whether Ministers would classify a delay caused by incorporation as an example of a "good reason" is unclear.
Another point of interest is the approach adopted by the court in considering the appeal. The Act is silent as to the nature of the appeal conferred, and there was some 12 Finding in fact 15. It seems these fi gures were amended downwards somewhat and those names who signed the petition under the pretence that the buyout was solely to prevent development were discounted, to remove the appearance that the buyout was a blocking measure rather than a precursor to sustainable development: see the remarks of Richard Frew, for the Executive, summarised at 94 F-H. Vol 11 2007 the edinburgh law review uncertainty as to how the court would handle the case. 21 As it happened, the court adopted a narrow approach, refusing to reconsider the merits despite encouragement from Holmehill's counsel to do so.
22 Such a limited approach severely curtailed Holmehill's chances of success, and any future appeal against a Ministerial decision will face a similar test. 23 It was accepted that the Carltona 24 principles applied, with the result that decisions of the civil service were equated with those of the Scottish Ministers.
25 While this point may be uncontroversial from a legal point of view, it has not escaped criticism from commentators. Andy Wightman, a land reform activist who appeared in the case as an expert witness for the pursuers, has been particularly critical of this aspect of the judgment.
26 This may also be criticised from a more theoretical point of view, as discretion and property law tend to make unhappy bedfellows. 27 Discretion often comes at the expense of certainty, so those exercising discretion must be beyond reproach. Sheriff McSherry, understandably, felt that it was not for him to replace the original decision with his own, 28 but to describe the decision-makers as "duly constituted and elected" 29 while in the same breath accepting the Carltona principles is slightly misleading. In the light of the legislative scheme, the sheriff's approach is diffi cult to fault, but his decision serves to highlight the crucial role played by civil servants: whether they deserve that role is another matter entirely.
It is worth observing that late registrations are now more likely to be refused than in the days immediately following the enactment of the legislation. analysis Vol 11 2007 unsurprising that the sheriff was reluctant to interfere with the decision that Holmehill Limited had not provided "good" reasons for the delay, noting that there was "nothing in the reasons given...amounting to good reason when considered in light of the policy principles [of the Act]". 31 If such a view is adopted in future caseswhere the policy principle against late registration is elevated above that of increasing community ownership of land -it is diffi cult to imagine any reasons for lateness being accepted as good.
32
Another interesting aspect of the Holmehill case is that, somewhat inexplicably, Ministers failed to give as a reason for their refusal the lack of "signifi cantly greater support" in the community than would have been required for an application under section 38.
33 Sheriff McSherry found this particularly striking, noting that: 34 it is a mystery…why the Scottish Ministers regarded 13.62 per cent as being signifi cantly greater support than 10 per cent and did not refuse the application on that ground. However, I concede that it is for them to exercise their discretion in this respect.
This observation leads naturally to a follow-on question: what would have happened if the other two tests had somehow been met and a landowner wished to appeal against a failure to reject under the "signifi cantly greater" test? Apparently the landowner would have been unsuccessful.
C. PUBLIC INTEREST, THE PLANNING PROCESS AND THE FAIRLIE DISPUTE
Despite suggestions that Holmehill was the fi rst application under section 61 of the Act, this honour seems to fall on a case involving the Earl of Glasgow and a community in Fairlie, but on that occasion the application was made by the landowner. 35 Interestingly, the Executive in this instance were arguing for registration, and the arguments raised in the pleadings of the Fairlie case make for an intriguing read alongside the Holmehill judgment.
36
In Holmehill, there was a perception that the community's plan to acquire ownership was in fact an attempt to "thwart" the planning process.
37 Richard Frew, the Scottish Executive's only witness in the case, seemed to be of the view that any attempts to acquire ownership while alternative plans were in place were to be discouraged. He noted that "the planning system was already there to prevent development that was The practical effect of ownership, once accomplished, is to give the owner control over land use and a veto over development that the owner does not like. The community right to buy had the potential to subvert the planning process…[I]n the real world, I would think it unlikely that the planning process would be commenced or continued with, for example, in respect of an application to allow housebuilding, if the developer was aware that the land was subject to a community right to buy.
In the Fairlie case, the land was subject to an unadopted local plan within the terms of section 11 of the Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Act 1997. Here, the issue was not the "thwarting" of the planning process by the community. Instead, it was argued for the pursuer that "the proposal brought forward by Fairlie is intended to thwart the development of the site as was proposed by him by way of objection to the Local Plan". 40 In the Executive's reply to these pleadings, it was noted that "the application to register a community interest by Fairlie was not made to subvert the public interest, rather to promote it. The operation of the local plan process is not a reason for the second defenders to refuse to register an interest in the RCIL pursuant to the 2003 Act." 41 On this point, it should also be noted that the Scottish Executive's guidance for community bodies states that "inclusion in [a] local plan should not, of itself, prevent the land from being registered".
42
This divorce from planning law is in direct contrast to the approach of the Executive in Holmehill. Read side by side, these two approaches highlight the absurdity of confl ating the planning process with the right to buy: while one community was criticised for thwarting the planning process, the other was criticised for thwarting the chance to object. In fact, the position adopted in Holmehill seems highly damaging to the effectiveness of the right to buy. When rural land is transferred, it is not uncommon for a change of use to be proposed (the scenario of a farmer selling a fi eld to a developer being a prime example). Holmehill seems to suggest that, once planning permission is obtained for a development, or perhaps even before, the development is viewed as being in the public interest, and resistance by way of a community buyout is no longer permitted, regardless of the relative merit of an alternative proposal. 
